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Foreign Investment In Canada and Mexico: 
An Agenda for Host Country Screening 
by WilUam 8. Barnes-
Multinational Enterprise may be structured with full au-
thority and centralization in world headquarters or they may 
allow considerable discretion and decisionmaking to the man-
agement of the national or local subsidiary. Obviously where 
there is significant local participation in the ownership of the 
subsidiary, management is likely to be appointed locally and 
responsible to local shareholders as well as to the foreign 
investor. On the other hand many wholly-owned subsidiaries 
only have a very general coordinated policy dictated by head-
quarters and are allowed to be flexible and responsive to local 
requirements at the operational location. The corporate form 
of a multinational enterprise depends in large measure upon 
the national law where the subsidiaries are located. Restrictions 
may be introduced at the time of the original foreign invest-
ment or in the course of the operations within the country. 
In any case, the first opportunity the host state has to impose 
such restrictions upon a multinational is at the entry point. 
That is, at the time in which the investment is screened by 
the appropriate host country administrative body and approved 
or disapproved. The threshold screening procedures may con-
tain provisions about the composition and appointment of man-
• William. S. Barnes is a ProfeBBor of International Law at the Fletcher School of 
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. This article is part of a forthcoming book 
on multinational enterprise. 
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agement or restrict the freedom of headquarters to make 
management appointments and decisions. Since most multi-
national corporations assume that the decisions taken at head-
quarters are binding on its subsidiaries operating abroad, it 
is essential that multinationals know what restrictions, if any, 
are imposed by host countries on foreign subsidiaries operating 
within their borders. The decisions whether to invest at all 
or as to the most appropriate corporate form will turn upon 
host country's policies on long term investment, production, 
distribution, pricing, licensing and employment. In determining 
what factors should be considered in formulating the appropri-
ate relationship between multinational headquarters and na-
tional subsidiaries, Canada is a model with its Foreign 
Investment Review Act.! Even though many countries have 
not yet developed a thorough and adequate system for screen-
ing investments, the trend is definitely in the direction of more 
oversight2 and the Canadian experience is especially relevant. 
Host countries can promote desirable types of foreign-based 
or foreign-controlled private enterprise only if they take steps 
to set 1;lp a permanent administrative agency or mechanism 
whose sole purpose is to determine which foreign investors are 
desirable.8 Likewise, it is necessary to provide a screening pro-
cedure which will exclude those foreign enterprises having 
little or nothing to contribute to a host country's long-term 
. economic objectives. The key to effective regulation is review. 
Both Mexico,4 and Canada have instituted screening tech-
niques.1I While this is due in large measure to both their com-
1 GRAY, CANADIAN DEP'T. OF INDUS. & CoMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTKJ:NT 
IN CANADA (1972). 
2 Canada and Mexico have been in the forefront in developing screening polieies 
due to a variety of historical and geographical factors. However, other states have 
begun· to apply relatively sophisticated screening techniques to foreign investment 
proposals. 8e6 LE BOULANGER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE 1974 EGyPTIAN FOUIGN IN· 
VESTMENT REGULATIONS, 9 Journal of World Trade Law 80 (1976); , 
PANAMA AND THE MULTINATIONAL CoRPORATION, TAX HAVEN AND 0TuEa CoN. 
SlDERATIONS, 8 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, 626 (1974) auo .ee, THE EXPEBIENCB 01' 
THE HOST CoUNTRIES, (I. Litvak & C. Maule eds. 1971). 
8 8e6 Gray Report, supra note 1. 
4 Wright, Foreign Enterprise in Mexico: Law and Policies, (1971). 
118e6 Gray Report, supra note 1. 
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mon borders with the United States, the home of most of the 
multinational corporations, the Canadian and Mexican ex-
periences are especially useful in analyzing screening tech-
niques applicable in a variety of national economic settings. 
This article will examine the legislation of these two countries 
to determine the features which are most effective in achieving 
effective screening, the threshold regulation of foreign invest-
ment. This analysis of the appropriateness and effectiveness 
of certain screening techniques will proceed from the perspective 
of a host country. By looking at foreign investors from this 
point of view, we must then distinguish between foreigners 
seeking to organize businesses in host countries via long- and 
short-term contracts for the importation of goods and services 
as opposed to those wishing to make a direct foreign invest-
ment and establish a local corporation to operate the produc-
tion and distribution of the goods and services they have to 
offer. This distinction is crucial in determining what type of 
screening techniques should be adopted by host country 
governments.8 
For example, a multinational establishing a branch sales 
office may not be subject to the same rules as an incorporated 
entity with direct foreign capital investment. Obviously the 
sales branch does not require formal incorporation under the 
local law, and foreigners may well be permitted to make 
sales or purchases in the country without fulfilling any for-
malities. In other words, the screening device will distinguish 
between those activities which any individual or corporation 
could freely undertake within the country and those which would 
require special or general approval. Even if the host country 
has a policy against foreign participation in certain sectors 
of the economy, such prohibitions may not apply with equal 
force to branches and wholly or partially-owned subsidiary 
corporations. However a standard requirement that all foreign 
entities must register in order to do business in the host coun-
try should be included in the law of the host country relating 
6 See Wright, supra note 4, 210. 
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to direct foreign investment. For example, the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations of Mexico reached both foreign investors 
and businessmen by requiring permits for the incorporation of 
any branch or local company whatever its nature or purpose.T 
The mechanisms for review of foreign entry into Canada 
have resulted from governmental alarm at domination of the 
Canadian economy by foreign interests. The reasons leading 
Canada to introduce a review process could well be applied 
to other host countries even though they are not experiencing 
the same degree of foreign presence or predominance: first, 
that foreign investment has a role to play in future economic 
development where it contributes to realizing national industrial 
objectives; second, that special measures to deal with certain 
problems will be required no matter how rosy the picture in 
the future; third, that costs and benefits of foreign direct 
investment vary from industry-to-industry and from case-to-
case, thereby requiring flexibility rather than :fixed rules;8 
fourth, that good performance is more important than local 
ownership and control of a firm.1I The Canadian Review Agency 
has not, yet acquired other functions which might give it the 
kind of autonomy which has been achieved over years by 
its Mexican counterpart. Autonomy in the Mexican agency 
was emphasized in 1967 when the Mexican government decided 
to refer all foreign applications to incorporate to the Ministry 
of Industry and Commerce. As a result, applications to estab-
T Wright, B.K., Itlfn'G note 4, 104, citing the Law on Economic Powers of 1950, as 
amended by decree of Feb. 10, 1959. 
8 Flexibility i8 crucial to etfective screening. Wright has emphasized the fact that 
Mexico haa relatively few fiat statutory prohibitions against foreign participation 
in particular industries. Wright states: 
The polley of the government (of MeDco) though not codified in a 
law, that most private foreign capital should take a minority interest 
in aaaoeiation with Mexican capital is becoming increasingly firm and 
is enforced by other but equally elfective means. Because of the flezi-
WU" thul atforded and the etfeetivenesl of enforcement of govern· 
ment policy in the absence of a general Itatute it seeml highly unlikely 
that any serioul attempt will be made to enact a law on the subject 
within the foreseeable future. 
Wright, Foret,. B,derprilB ill JCBlrico: UfO Gild Polioiu, pp. 95-96 (1971). 
t 6187 Beport, nJlftl note 1, ~1. 
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lish new Mexican businesses are being examined on a case-by-
case basis, with the result that the proportion of foreign owner-
ship is able to be restricted in more and more industries.1o 
It is interesting in this regard to compare the administrative 
screening process in Canada. There, the Canadian Review 
Agency registers foreign takeovers, foreign acquisition of ex-
isting Canadian companies, as well as screens foreign invest-
ment projects, including licensing arrangements involving 
foreign partners. Moreover, the agency assumes a general 
advisory role on behalf of the Canadian government by gather-
ing pertinent economic and statistical data and carrying out 
investigations. Without arguing the obvious benefits of a well-
administered flexible review process, screening legislation must 
spell out the guidelines to be followed. For example, the pro-
cedure should include information on the nature of the product 
line and the extent of rationalization in the corporation organ-
ization. Since this would be most relevant to determining its 
joint venture tolerance, such information could save the un-
pleasantness of applying more stringent controls to a recalci-
trant foreigner. 
Another factor to be taken into account is the. relationship 
of the local subsidiary to the parent and its international affili-
ates, including managerial lines of reporting from subsidiary 
to parent. This is a clear recognition of the dual character of 
the foreign direct investor, an essential characteristic of multi-
national enterprise so often overlooked by government policy-
makers. Other factors are: the technology to be employed and 
how it compares with technology available locally; the foreign-
er's plans for product innovation in the host country since the 
attitude of the investor on these matters is crucial in deter-
mining his commitment to local production and local research 
and development. Other factors which will serve as a basis for 
accepting or rejecting foreign applicants are the corporation's 
export plans and the extent to which the local subsidiary is to 
be excluded from certain export markets, either because of the 
10 Wright, B'Ilpra note 4. 110-111. 
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parent's global marketing strategy or because of laws and 
regulations of the parent's home government.ll Local content 
rules, that is, requiring the use of local materials, equipment, 
components and services as well as the hiring of local managers 
and employees will need to be determined. 
Perhaps the most significant factor is the financing of the 
enterprise and the opportunity for local equity participation. 
Government review agencies should also be aware of the possi-
bility that firms organized by foreign investors will experience 
growth through borrowing and reinvestment of profits from 
local sales. This may however simply result in an increase in 
the value of foreign-owned equity without any benefit to the 
host country. Those industries which produce raw materials 
by exploiting local natural resources should be screened with 
respect to their plans for local processing of these resources. 
In Canada the agency would also investigate the economic 
contribution which foreign investors would make as well as 
their competitive impact on local industry. 
The application of these guidelines suggests considerable 
variation in the treatment of foreign investment, depending 
on the case. If it fell below a certain threshold of economic 
significance, the de minimis principle might allow any type of 
foreign investment. The local government might negotiate 
terms of entry which would insure that more of the enterprise's 
local operations could be based locally, thereby rationalizing 
overall production in favor of local economies of seale and 
export potential. In cases where there is little distinction that 
the foreigner offers or can offer in the future, the terms may be 
limited to operating under a licensing arrangement with local 
11 Bee, Hardari, The Structure of the Private Multinational Enterprise, 71 MICH. 
L. REV. 729, 749 (1973), there it is noted with respect to a multinational'. pre-
sumption of direct control of its subsidiaries that: 
one of the major problems faced by the developing MNE is the neces-
sity of allocating control over foreign operations. In general terms, 
MNE's tend to centralize control of basic strategies in order to operate 
in the most efficient manner and to exploit operations on a worldwide 
basil; such coordination is vital becaulle of their multiple a1Illiates' 
operations in potentially overlapping markets. 
Bee also Barnes, MtdtilGtI7, 23 AK. U. L. REv. 313 (1973). 
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producers or at most, a joint venture with a local firm. Where 
the review process turned up a would-be-foreign investment 
that could be downright detrimental to local interests in ac-
cordance with the guidelines, the entry would be blocked. As 
the Gray Report notes in its discussion of the rejection of a 
proposed foreign direct investment "it is more likely to occur 
in the case of takeovers, particularly in the resource industries 
where the foreign countries may contribute very little. "11 
Improved local capabilities will obviously improve the bar-
gaining power of the review agency but there is still the problem 
of what to do when a foreign investor loses his attractiveness 
over the years and local aspirants would like to see him out. 
This need for some form of a nationalization policy is reflected 
in the first instance by a policy reserving certain industries for 
local firms. Where the government finds that local ownership 
is important or even essential to the national interest and policy 
objectives, then the screening process gives way to a fixed rule 
that certain sectors could only be developed by locally controlled 
firms. The review process is not designed or operated to pro-
tect local enterprise, although the Gray Report suggests that 
this element of protection could be added without great diffi-
culty. The legislation in both Canada and Mexico now requires 
registration with the review agency of the following: (1) acqui-
sition of majority interest in local firms by foreign interests, 
so-called "takeover"; (2) foreign companies making direct 
investment for the first time; (3) new licensing or franchise 
contracts; (4) existing foreign controlled companies. 
Whether these host countries should also extend their control 
over locally-based multinational concerns which might go on 
to make investments abroad would depend on the balance of 
payments, employment, and other effects which such overseas 
activity might cause. (Hosts can become homes as readily as 
homes become hosts.) The benefits of local ownership and con-
trol may be reduced by expansion beyond the borders. There 
will usually be more than one agency involved in the review 
12 Gray Report, 1111"'0 note 1, 459. 
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process as has been the situation in Mexico, and will become 
inevitable in Canada. Acquisitions of a local firm by a foreigner 
would have to meet the general merger provisions and the rules 
applying to foreign takeovers. 
The Gray Report points out that this cannot be avoided with-
out removing all consideration of foreign mergers from compe-
tition policy and all takeovers from the jurisdiction of the 
review agency. 
"For example, if the review agency blocked the takeover of 
a Canadian firm because the foreigner would not add any-
thing of significance to its operations in terms of technology, 
managerial efficiency, markets, etc., there would be nothing 
to stop the particular foreign direct investor from setting 
up a company in Canada and perhaps managing to drive the 
Canadian out of business. " 18 
Under any review procedure, certain investments will be dis-
couraged and the way opened to foreigners to resort to licensing, 
joint ventures, and management contracts, which may not be 
subject to review. Since export restrictions, foreign procure-
ment and exorbitant fees can be imposed on local business by 
foreigners through these techniques, it behooves the watchful 
host to check on them as well. In fact, they may be used to 
exercise effective control over a local licensee or even a local 
majority participant. Of the four major subjects of regulation 
which need to be studied carefully by the review agency, the' 
most difficult is the existing firm which has outlived the useful-
ness of its foreign connections.u The review mechanism can 
promote good corporate citizenship by looking at those existing 
foreign-controlled firms which benefit from public assistance 
with a view to obtaining better performance from them. Since 
existing foreign-controlled firms are the source of much of the 
growth of foreign control over the local economy, it is especially 
important to review major new investments by the old time 
foreign firms. There are cogent arguments against screening 
18 Gra)' Report, 0,. cCt. p. 4811. 
16 Bee Nell, P., "Bome" Bestrietiou on Overseas Investment in New ZealaDd," 1 
A.ueklaDcl L. B. 113, 118 (1967). 
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such investments, especially if foreign controlled firms enlist 
the support of their home governments against the substitu-
tion of administrative judgment for the working of the market-
place. These arguments have often dissuaded host governments 
from taking any action against existing foreign-controlled busi-
ness except where planned expansion is drawing heavily on 
local capital markets. In considering the detrimental results to 
the local economy which arise from limited review authority 
such as use of its internal resources or moving funds through 
transfer pricing techniques to avoid the review mechanism, one· 
concludes that the review agency should have the authority to 
screen all the activities of existing foreign-controlled firms 
whether making major new investments or not. 
All host states are justified in subjecting foreign-controlled 
firms to administrative intervention for the following reasons: 
(1) Local firms benefit the local economy or else their per-
formance is, or can be, set straight by domestic policies, whereas 
the benefits from foreign firms largely accrue to interests out-
side the host country. Therefore local policy may legitimately 
redress the balance so as to maximize the benefits that accrue 
locally. 
(2) Local firms are not subject to foreign private influences 
as are foreign-controlled firms and are more likely to respond 
to local needs without special rules. 
(3) Local firms are not as likely to frustrate local policy as 
are foreign multinational enterprises, able to go elsewhere. 
(4) Foreign law and foreign public policy may use foreign 
investment as a vehicle for extraterritorial application. 
(5) Host government review of foreign-controlled firms nor-
mally involves a relatively small part of the parent corpora-
tion's global operations. 
The close connection between trade and investment policies 
is clear. The government might block foreign investment in 
key sectors where it sought to encourage local enterprise, yet 
reduce tariff and trade barriers so as to allow competitive 
pressures from abroad on the otherwise protected local industry. 
10 BOSTON CoLLEGE INTDNATIONAL '" CoKPAlI.ATlVIl LAW JOUU'AL [VoL 1, No. 1 
As the Gray Report concludes in its final paragraph, all policies 
- trade, investment and other economic measures - can be 
used to carry out the national strategy of industrial 
development.lI 
111 8ee The Gray Report, npra note I, 443. 
